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BOOK REVIEW
RIGHTS AND "RIGHTS TALK"
RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE.
1 New York: The Free Press. I991. Pp.

Mary Ann Glendon.
218.

By

xvi,

$22.95.

2
Reviewed by Richard A. Epstein

American culture and American legal institutions have of late been
overwhelmed by a chronic uneasiness and discomfort. Violence between the races, tension between the sexes over harassment and employment policy, disenchantment with welfare, stagnation in educational achievement, and the breakdown of the family all loom larger
and more intractable today than they did a generation ago. Our
inability to dent, let alone solve, these problems with billions of dollars
in government spending has spawned public frustration about the
wisdom of our collective political choices and the effectiveness of our
political institutions. Our collective confidence in America as a nation
has reached a low ebb.
In this setting comes Mary Ann Glendon's provocative book,
Rights Talk. Writing with energy, elegance, style, and verve, Glendon
offers her diagnosis of one unappreciated component of the current
malaise: the impoverishment of our political discourse by shrill, divisive dialogue. In her view, our nation is afflicted with an excessive
preoccupation with individual rights and with the demands that these
rights entitle their holders to make on other citizens, often through
litigation (pp. 44-45). As extravagant claims proliferate, the public
forum becomes a battlefield between rival political factions and interest groups that bolster their positions with loud assertions of rights
(pp. 14-15). People use speech as a club to intimidate or posture, not
as a tool to teach and learn. According to Glendon, informal mechanisms of dispute resolution, which rest on the gentler discourse used
to resolve family differences around the dinner table, are all too often
lacking in modern American life (p. 15). Glendon argues that the
American concern with rights has become an obsession that fills the
air and drowns out the more subtle forms of public dialogue that once
allowed healing and uplifting to displace conflict and confrontation
(pp. 15-17).
1 Professor of Law, Harvard University.
2 James

iio6

Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
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Glendon finds the problem of misguided "rights talk" pervasive.
Whether the issue is flag burning (p. iio), abortion (pp. 164-68),
privacy (pp. 48-61), or property rights (pp. 20-32), we discover the
same decline in the public dialogue that shapes our collective lives.
As our nation grows more heterogeneous, the decline in public discourse exacts an ever higher price. But far from learning from each
other or from other nations, Americans turn inward and dismiss the
experiences other nations have had with similar problems (pp. 14546). As Glendon explains:
Our rights talk, in its absoluteness, promotes unrealistic expectations,
heightens social conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might lead toward
consensus, accommodation, or at least the discovery of common
ground. In its silence concerning responsibilities, it seems to condone
acceptance of the benefits of living in a democratic social welfare
state, without accepting the corresponding personal and civic obligations. In its relentless individualism, it fosters a climate that is inhospitable to society's losers, and that systematically disadvantages
caretakers and dependents, young and old. In its neglect of civil
society, it undermines the principal seedbeds of civic and personal
virtue. In its insularity, it shuts out potentially important aids to the
process of self-correcting learning. All of these traits promote mere
assertion over reason-giving (p. 14).

Glendon is no thoughtless realist or naive utopian who thinks that
the legal system can get along without any conception of rights and
duties (pp. 15-16). But she forcefully insists that individual claims of
rights without the acceptance of correlative sets of duties are the main
source of the unrealistic demands that Americans make on each other
and on their public institutions (pp. 45-46, 76-89). Many elements
in her indictment ring true, for the relentless pursuit of individual
and group self-interest through uncompromising "rights talk" has had
a corrosive effect on both public discourse and public institutions.
Nonetheless, for both historical and theoretical reasons, I think
Glendon places too much blame on rights discourse. Each generation
has had its own shrill debates on matters it deemed central. Far
uglier forms of public discourse infected this nation and the world
during the 1930s, when virulent forms of political extremism -

jin-

goism, racism, communism, fascism, and Nazism - pervaded and
degraded public life. It is also sobering to recall the massive Southern
resistance to integration during the 195os and the bitter political conflicts over the Vietnam war. At times, Glendon writes as if these
major social movements are influenced by the rhetoric that lawyers
and judges bring to the cases before them (pp. 95-96). But I suspect
that the truth is otherwise. These struggles over war and peace,
religion, and race are for better or for worse perpetual items on the
public agenda, and there was, and is, little that judges and lawyers
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could do to moderate public debate over these issues. "Rights talk"
does not fall within the exclusive province of lawyers. It may well
be that highs and lows in political dialogue are beyond the control of
any social or legal order.
Instructive evidence against Glendon's Rights Talk thesis is marshaled by Gerald Rosenberg in his recent book The Hollow Hope.3
Rosenberg painstakingly examines a number of political controversies
since World War II, most notably civil rights4 since Brown v. Board
of Education5 and abortion, 6 and concludes in each case 7 that the
moral discourse that shaped public dialogue - and the ultimate substantive results - had little to do with what was done and said in
the courts. Instead, Rosenberg finds that parties on all sides advanced
their claims and responded to opponents with moral arguments based
on sources raging from Biblical texts to contemporary social theory.8
At one level, Rosenberg's argument reinforces Glendon's position by
showing that misguided rhetoric can often intensify political debate.
But for Rosenberg, the situation is quite the opposite. Public debate
may be rich and informed, or it may be ignorant or impoverished.
But in either case the state of that debate will be determined by social
conditions that lawyers did little to create and can do little to
change. 9
I do not want, however, to dwell on matters of historical perspective and public debate. I want instead to challenge the basic proposition in Rights Talk directly. Glendon's particular substantive views
are often unclear, for she does not address the major regulatory and
constitutional reforms of the New Deal; but she makes clear her
general approval of the present constitutional order at least in the
reduced level of protection it affords private property (pp. 27-32).
She finds a close fit between the individualistic ethic that she believes
underlies concepts of private property and the decline of public discourse and debate- (p. 14). Historically, this is a curious assertion,
because the decline in the judicial protection of property rights in the
name of the community long predates the decline in our public discourse. On a theoretical level, Glendon errs in two quarters. She
misperceives the nature and function of property rights and ignores
important ways in which the vigorous protection of property rights

3 GERALD N.

ROSENBERG,

THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL

CHANGE? (I99i).
4 See id. at 39-i69.
5 347 U.S. 483 (i954).
6 See ROSENBERG, supra note 3, at 173-265.
7 The other topics, covered more briefly, include reapportionment law, criminal law, and
environmental law. See id. at 269-335.
8 See id. at 139-50.
9 See id. at 75-82.

1992]

BOOK REVIEW

110o9

may, perhaps, paradoxically promote more restrained and enlightened
public discourse. I deal first with the questions of private property
and takings with which Glendon begins her book; thereafter I cover
more briefly two other issues to which she devotes considerable attention: the good Samaritan question in torts and the question of abortion. Although the specifics of each debate differ, one common theme
remains: she attaches too little weight to the content of the rights and
overlooks the powerful ways in which that content shapes dialogue.

I. PROPERTY AND TAKINGS

A. Disputes Between Neighbors
In The Uses of Absolutism (pp. 18-46), Glendon directs her initial
salvo against an absolute conception of property rights. She zeroes in
on Blackstone's familiar paean to property as "'that sole and despotic
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things
of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in
the universe"' (p. 23).10 Glendon isolates what she considers the
ostensible vice in Blackstone's thinking: "Property rights are absolute,
individual, and exclusive" (p. 23).
What is wrong with a system of absolute rights that allows individuals to exclude some persons on a whim and admit others only by
mutual consent? By and large, nothing. Over vast ranges of human
activity, absolute rights are the indispensable baseline against which
various kinds of market transactions are conducted. The greater
power to exclude includes the lesser power to admit on conditions. It
is exactly this principle that allows a seller to hold out for a higher
price and the buyer to insist upon a lower one. Each is allowed to
walk away from the deal if his terms are not satisfied. The principle
that applies to price carries over to other terms as well, including
terms regulating financing and use. Effective markets in land cannot
function without the secure baselines guaranteed by the absolute system of property rights at common law.1 1 As long as there are many
buyers and sellers, robust markets will emerge in which any abuse of
discretion in the exercise of rights is effectively restrained, not by the
heavy-handed use of government power, but by the presence of alternative buyers and sellers. Those who exercise absolute rights in a
capricious fashion pay for their folly by losing their markets.
10 Glendon quotes 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
11 There are, of course, complications with this basic position, chiefly when the government
or private parties exercise monopoly power. I treat this issue extensively in Richard A. Epstein,
The Supreme Court, 1987 Term - Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and
the Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REv. 4, 16-i9 (1988).
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There are, of course, situations in which the preconditions that
make absolute rights workable are not satisfied. Unfortunately, Glendon nowhere in her book analyzes property rights in resources such
as water, for which the mix of common law and statutory rights does
not assume the same absolute form that it takes for land and chattels. 12 There is, moreover, ample reason for the difference. Water,
unlike land, is not neatly divisible. A system that allows any riparian
owner to dam a river and to convert all its water to private use
deprives everyone of the "going concern" value of the river, including
the river's its uses for recreational, navigational, and aesthetic purposes.1 3 To preserve the value of these common uses, the common
law of Blackstone's time provided for none of the absolute rights that
Glendon attributes to the common law of property. On the contrary,
the "natural flow" theories of water rights dominant in Blackstone's
England stressed the correlative nature of rights and duties 14 - a
theme close to Glendon's heart (pp. 76-IO8).

Efficient markets in

water resources could not emerge if each of a hundred riparian owners
could block the others from making any use of a common resource. 1s
Glendon does not adequately address the details of the complex
subject of property rights and their optimal configuration. Her attack
on absolute property rights is flawed by her failure to identify and
assess the substantive consequences that result from the systematic
adoption of such absolute rights. In this context, it is not sufficient
to condemn all systems of absolute rights on the ground that they
sometimes leave some people out in the cold. A strong critique must
also consider the dangers of forcing individuals to open their property
to persons whom they would prefer, for whatever reason, to exclude.
There are many hard cases on the right to exclude, which I cannot
12 For a similar analysis of property in the spectrum, see JONATHAN IV. EMORD, FREEDOM,
TECHNOLOGY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 119-31, 301-I (iggi); and R. H. Coase, The
Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. I, 35-40 (1959). For the case of oil and
gas, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 219-23 (i985).
13 See Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 979-82

(1985).
14 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 849 (1977).

Is For a discussion of some of the complications, see Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency
in the Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261 (i99o). Rose develops
the thesis that the reconfiguration of property rights was driven largely by the changes in the

relative values of the different uses to which water could be put. In essence, when water had
little productive use, a system that prevented extensive private exploitation of a river without

the consent of neighbors had low social costs. Once mills became an important source of power,
however, the blockade right created under the natural flow theory yielded by twists and turns
to a reasonable user theory, which allowed more intensive instream use of water without the
consent of neighbors. There is, accordingly, a sensible efficiency explanation for the switch
between different configurations of water rights. See id. at 294-96.
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deal with here. 16 But it is useful to look at one system that eliminates
that right of exclusion: rent control.
Rent control repudiates the absolute system of property rights in
land because it allows the tenant to remain in possession of the
landlord's property in defiance of the terms of the lease at a rent fixed
by the state - usually fixed by a local government controlled by a
political coalition of similarly situated tenants. 17 Glendon does not
address this system and its grotesque resource misallocations; she may
well disapprove of it. However, it offers a powerful counterexample
to her thesis because it shows how the abandonment of absolute rights
can lead to a decline in levels of public discourse. Rent control does
not merely set maximum rents; it protects current tenants - who are
current voters - from their landlords. The political coalition supporting rent control would dissolve instantly if landlords could expel
current tenants on the condition that new tenants be offered the
controlled price. What tenant would vote for a scheme that would
expose him at the end of a lease to eviction and to his landlord's
vengeance?18

Rent control provides the antithesis to Blackstone's relentless individualism - and it leads inexorably to the very impoverishment of
political dialogue that Glendon rightly deplores in Rights Talk. Glendon works in Cambridge, Massachusetts and must be aware of that
city's continual titanic battles between landlord and tenant. 19 How
16 One such system that I do not discuss here is that of the civil rights laws, which contain
explicit limitations on the right to exclude. Although I cannot develop the case against these
laws here, I call for their repeal in RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (forthcoming 1992) (manuscript on file at the
Harvard Law School Library). Earlier and shorter statements of my position may be found in
Richard A. Epstein, Two Conceptions of Civil Rights, Soc. PHIL. & POLY, Spring 199i, at 38,
58-59; and Richard A. Epstein, The Paradox of Civil Rights, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 299
(i99o). The connection between unsound legal regimes and impoverished discourse is illustrated

by the desultory debate over the i99i Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 1o5 Stat. 1071

(to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), which resulted in the joyless signing of a
convoluted piece of social legislation by a reluctant President hounded by an irritable Congress.
17It is not accidental that rent controls are not set at the state level. The delegation of
power down to local communities permits the selective imposition of controls, and thus allows
political power to be concentrated with far greater effectiveness than would otherwise be
possible.
1 I have voiced on several occasions my categorical opinion that all forms of rent control
are flatly unconstitutional under the Takings Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. V, and I affirm that
position again here. See EPSTEIN, supra note 12, at 186-88; Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control
and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 741, 742-50 (1988).
19 Many cases illustrate this depressing spectacle. See, e.g., Gilbert v. City of Cambridge,
932 F.2d 51, 53-55 (ist Cir. 1991); Flynn v. City of Cambridge, 418 N.E.2d 335, 335-37 (Mass.
1981); see also William Tucker, Anarchy, State, and Rent Control, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec.
22, i986, at 20 (describing the tortured efforts of Erich Segal to pry Robert Nozick out of his
rent-controlled apartment).
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can such dialogue be anything but shrill and impoverished? An enormous gulf separates the maximum rents that tenants will pay to
remain in their present apartments and the minimum rent that landlords will take to remain in business. Each side is therefore prepared
to spend large sums of money and political capital to tilt the overall
rate structure in its favor. The system thus invites an endless cycle
of political competition in which valuable resources are always wasted
on distributional struggles. The losses should not be calculated in
narrow economic terms: they also sow ill-will and class conflict in
public discourse. The Cambridge political side-show does not take
place in Chicago (a city certainly known for divisive politics on other
issues), where leases turn over uneventfully each year at the end of
May and October. The deterioration in political discourse in Cambridge therefore cannot be attributed to the temper of our troubled
times, or to a shift in social attitudes toward rights, or to different
world views in Cambridge and Chicago. Its causes are local and
prosaic and depend upon the specific incentive structures created by
positive law. If rent control is introduced in Chicago, Chicago will
go the way of Cambridge, New York, Berkeley, and Santa Monica.
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that all disputes over
property rights, even in land, should be resolved by turning to Blackstone's regime of absolute rights. Although those rights work well
when free entry ensures the creation of competitive markets, they
function poorly when no close substitutes to the property held by a
single individual are available. In many settings, especially those
involving neighbors, the physical circumstances of adjacent ownership
create bilateral monopoly problems. 2° Simple rules of forbearance
against physical invasion, so useful in many contexts, cannot resolve
these disputes because of the bargaining difficulties that ensue from
bilateral monopolies. 21 If the law held that any physical invasion,
however trivial, constituted a nuisance that could subject its creator
to actions for damages and injunctions, who would prove the winner
from so grotesque a scheme? Everyone would violate the rules in
question and would be faced by a host of demands for damages or
injunctions brought by disgruntled or vengeful neighbors. If a system
of absolute rights entails that result, surely no one should want it.
The system of neighborliness that Glendon praises is as appropriate
for low-level boundary disputes as a system of regulation is inappropriate for setting rents in apartment units.
20 This theme is developed by other authorities as well. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill,
Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of DeterminingProperty Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 1420 (1985); see also Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REv.
55, 57-59 (1987) (suggesting that bilateral monopolies foster "strategic bargaining problems" that
impair the operation of the Coase Theorem).
21 See Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: CorrectiveJustice and Its UtilitarianConstraints,

8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 74-94 (1979).
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What Glendon should have added is that the common law rule of
"live and let live" permits reciprocal, low-level interferences between
neighbors and thus effectively undermines all actions for damages and
injunctions. The rule fosters a dialogue of accommodation by encouraging small adjustments on each side and by imposing penalties
on persons who act with malice in neighbor situations. This rule is
not the product of some modern communitarian concept. Rather, it
is most forcefully expressed in the nineteenth-century writings of
Baron Bramwell, an able intellectual descendant of Locke and Blackstone and perhaps the most consistent champion of property rights
ever to sit on an English or American court. 22 The Restatement of
Torts2 3 has adopted the rule, and it lies at the heart of some of the
most sensible interpretation of property rights by conservative economists who are ordinarily opposed to any governmental restrictions
on land

use.

24

The "live and let live" rule, however, does have its limitations.
Glendon describes at the outset of the book a suit brought against a
tenant by his landlord, on behalf of co-tenants, over the tolerable
levels of noise that the tenant could make in his apartment (p. 18).
In his own defense, the tenant argued that his home was his castle,
and that he therefore could make as much noise in it as he wanted.
The judge noted that the maxim was inappropriate because the tenant's castle was directly above his neighbor's castle and that some
accommodation should be made for the "auditory intimacy" associated
with modern apartment living (pp. 18-19). Nonetheless, the judge
held that the tenant below had to bear the noise, because the levels
were reasonable in light of the approaching Christmas season. His
wise counsel was that "[t]hey are all nice people and a little mutual
forbearance and understanding of each other's problems should resolve
the issues to everyone's satisfaction" (p. 19).
But what about the lease? It stated that no tenant or family
member should "make 'disturbing noises' or otherwise interfere with
the 'rights, comforts or conveniences of other tenants"' (p. 18). Glendon has little patience with the lease and notes that in relying on it
the landlord took an "equally extreme" position as the defendant, who
treated his home as his castle (p. 19). But she does not explain why
the lease should be dispatched so quickly in favor of Baron Bramwell's
external norm of reasonableness. There is a vast difference between
a sensible presumption when parties are silent about their preferences
22 See, e.g., Bamford v. Turnley, 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 32-34 (Ex. Ch. 1862).
23 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. g (977) ("[Elach individual in a

community must put up with a certain amount of annoyance . .

").

24 See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES I-Ii (i99i); Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules,

and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681, 779-81 (1973).
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and an iron command even when they have made their wishes clear.
One great virtue of the law of property (including the law of leases)
is that it allows smaller groups and communities to deviate from the
general standards of the legal system without having to gain a majority
vote of some larger body to express their preferences. If the noisy
tenant's conduct violated the lease, eviction was warranted if the lease
so provided.
The common law rule that contract "trumps" torts has powerful
implications for Glendon's basic thesis. This voluntary sorting allows
some groups of tenants to live in exceptionally quiet buildings while
other groups live in noisier buildings. 25 Abandoning rigid and uniform
presumptions of certain proper conduct between neighbors allows for
a greater degree of human satisfaction than would result under an
authoritarian legal regime that forces all persons, regardless of preferences, to come together under a single set of predetermined rules.
The key to a harmonious society does not lie - as Glendon suggests
- in forcing nice people to reason together until their disputes may
boil over; the key is allowing them to go their separate ways when
they cannot agree. By substituting hundreds of small, decentralized
decisions for a few monolithic, political ones, the institution of property removes the festering sources of conflict that account for much
of the current decline in public discourse. Glendon gets the thesis
backwards. Communal rights may be the source of communal disorder, but what she labels as the source, or manifestation, of the
disease -

absolute property rights -

is often its cure.

B. Takings and Public Use
The point made above is true not only in private disputes, but
also in disputes between citizen and state, an area in which property
rights have steadily declined over the course of this century. In this
context, too, Blackstone's view of property rights, as embodied in the
Takings Clause, 26 is far superior to the ostensibly more reasonable
position taken by Glendon in Rights Talk - a view that is all too
sympathetic to the current Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence.
Glendon and I agree that some form of eminent domain power should
reside in the state. To this extent, property rights are not absolute,
for individual owners are not allowed to hold out against the community at large if the community is prepared to pay them just compensation for their losses. The only differences between my view (or
Blackstone's) and Glendon's (or the current constitutional law) are the
25 The sorting point is of great importance in understanding what is wrong with the present
civil rights law. See EPSTEIN, supra note 16, (manuscript at 41, on file at the Harvard Law
School Library).

26 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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terms and conditions on which state take-over should be allowed.
Here, Glendon is attracted to the continental models of property
rights. Philosophically, she believes that they represent a better intellectual balance because they begin, not with the absolute property
rights associated with Locke and Blackstone, but with the more moderate communitarian views of Rousseau and Kant (pp. 34-37). In
Glendon's view, recognition of the claims of the community has borne
fruit in the German treatment of takings. In my opinion, the text of
the German Constitution on this point begs every important question
of principle imaginable. 27 Unfortunately, the analogous body of
American law is equally devoid of principle and all too often reaches
28
the same unsound conclusions.
My critique is a reprise of the criticism of private disputes offered
above, for again the current takings law that Glendon defends suffers
from the very vice that she deplores: the impoverishment of community values and political discourse. I will not dwell on these compar29
isons here because I have spoken about these issues elsewhere.
Instead, I turn here to the "public use" requirement of the Takings
Clause. Glendon goes to considerable lengths to illustrate the debasement of "rights talk" that occurred when the Michigan Supreme Court
sustained a forced transfer of property from one private owner to
another. 3° It is useful to set out her vivid description in its entirety:
The most striking example of how low the right of property has sunk
in the official hierarchy of constitutional values is a case decided at
the state level in I981. It is a case that illustrates dramatically how
cramped and impoverished rights talk can be. In order to induce
General Motors Corporation to build a new Cadillac assembly plant
that was projected to bring 6,ooo jobs to the area, the City of Detroit
agreed to use its power of eminent domain to acquire a site that GM
wanted. This was not just another forced transfer from one private
27 The German Constitution states:
(i) Property and the right of inheritance are guaranteed. Their content and limits shall
be determined by the laws.
(2) Property imposes duties. Its use should also serve the public weal.
(3) Expropriation shall be permitted only in the public weal. It may be effected only by

or pursuant to a law which shall provide for the nature and extent of the compensation.
GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 14 (F.R.G.).
25 See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978)
(holding that a prohibition against the alteration of a building by virtue of its designation as a
historical landmark is not an unconstitutional taking without compensation). Freezing current

structures robs a landowner of his development rights and induces public officials to ignore real
private losses in making their designation decisions. I have discussed some of these issues in
Richard A. Epstein, Not Deference But Doctrine: The Eminent Domain Clause, 1982 SUP. CT.
REV. 351, 353-56.
29 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 12, at 143-45 (dairy regulation); id. at 279-82 (labor
relations); id. at 131-34 (zoning).
30 See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Mich.
1981).
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owner to another: The land in question was an entire ethnic neighborhood known as "Poletown," complete with 1,40o homes, schools,
i6 churches, 144 local businesses, and a neighborhood organization
that begged the Michigan Supreme Court to save the community from
the wrecker's ball and the bulldozer. Originally a place where generations of Polish immigrants had made their home, Poletown was,
by the time it was marked for destruction, one of Detroit's oldest
racially integrated communities. The neighborhood residents - with
the combined power of City Hall, General Motors, the United Auto
Workers, the banks, and the news media arrayed against them naively thought that the courts would protect their property rights.
No amount of compensation, they pointed out, could repair the destruction of roots, relationships, solidarity, sense of place, and shared
memory that was at stake.
But our legal system did not afford them a ready way of talking
about such harms (pp. 29-30).
Glendon proceeds to explain that the plaintiffs lost their case when
the court held that the taking was for a public use, even though the
property ended up in the hands of a private company.
Glendon's own evidence should lead her to revise her views on
the takings power. She rightly recognizes that she cannot attribute
the indefensible outcome in Poletown to the absolute nature of property rights. On the contrary, the Poletown court accorded the state
an expansive power to infringe property rights (p. 3o). However,
Glendon does not recognize that the political machinations in Poletown
were made possible by the very communitarian orientation that she
embraces. She also fails to recognize a responsiveness to community,
associations, relationships, and sense of place in the ancient and wellestablished common law tort of interference with prospective advantage, 3 1 which would have led a court to the opposite result in Poletown. Similarly, the common law rules governing goodwill recognized
that, even though intangible, goodwill was an alienable and protectable property. 32 At common law, if a private party destroyed an
ongoing business, the loss of goodwill would have been one element
included in the damage calculation. Modern courts, however, have
systematically cut back the constitutional protection for goodwill in a
series of indefensible decisions and have solemnly concluded that goodwill is not taken by the state or a third party, but is merely de31 See, e.g., Keeble v. Hickeringill, 88 Eng. Rep. 898, 898 (Q.B. 17o6) (holding the defendant
liable for firing a gun to scare wildlife away from the plaintiff's decoy pond); Tarleton v.
M'Gawley, 570 Eng. Rep. 153, 154 (K.B. 1793) (holding a ship captain liable for firing cannons
to prevent Cameroon natives from trading with a competitor).
32 For a devastating critique of the rule denying compensation for goodwill, see Gideon
Kanner, When Is "Property" not "Property Itself": A Critical Examination of the Bases of
Denial of Compensation for Loss of Goodwill in Eminent Domain, 6 CAL. W. L. REV. 57, 6468 (1969).
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stroyed. 33 It is precisely such decisions that have produced the result
Glendon deplores. Here it is important to return to the classical
theory. If the purpose of the Takings Clause was, as Blackstone
would have had it, to ensure that the victims are indifferent between
their losses and the compensation provided, it is wholly incorrect to
base compensation on the state's small gains rather than on the far
larger losses of the victim. 34 The strong "rights talk" of the common
law could help prevent the concern about social disintegration that
Glendon and I share.

II.

DUTIES TO RESCUE

The subject of property rights is not the only area in which Glendon attacks the absolutism of the law. She also fires salvos at the
common law tort rule that no person has a duty to rescue a stranger
from predicaments for which that person is not causally responsible
(pp. 78-83). The standard illustration involves the refusal by an able
swimmer to pull a drowning child out of a swimming pool even when
the rescue would cause little inconvenience and no risk of harm to
the rescuer (p. 79). Glendon deplores the absolute right to ignore the
plight of others, if only because it brings back a vision of limited
government that was repudiated in this country during the I930S
(P. 95).
As with property, however, the problems she identifies transcend
matters of "rights talk" and implicate substance. The critical point
here concerns the interaction between legal remedies and other social
pressures and sanctions that can influence individuals whose actions
or omissions have grave consequences for the well-being of other
persons. Glendon asserts that the law should be the teacher of right
and wrong conduct (p. 85), even though she notes, as Gerald Rosenberg powerfully demonstrates, 35 that few people draw their moral
convictions of right or wrong from judicial decisions.
Even if law could teach, however, its lesson plan should not be
drafted as Glendon urges. The transition from social duties to legal
duties introduces enforcement costs that are not relevant in the purely
moral realm. These enforcement costs are far from trivial: lawsuits
are expensive, and erroneous results are worse than no results at all.
The simple question to be asked is whether the game is worth the
33 See, e.g., Community Redevelopment Agency v. Abrams, 543 P.2d 905, 916 (Cal. 1975).
34Compare BLACKSTONE, supra note io,at *135 (noting that when the state takes private

property for public use it pays compensation "for the injury thereby sustained") with Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (893) (insisting that "compensation
must be a full and perfect equivalent for the property taken"). Unlike "property taken," the
injury sustained covers consequential losses including interference with relational interests.

35See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
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candle. Some moral duties may be worth enforcing by law and others
may not. The duties to avoid aggression and theft are surely moral,
as -

in the minds of most -

are duties to perform benevolent acts,

such as rescue. But in the case of the latter, a system of informal
norms may influence behavior more effectively than a system of legal
coercion. 3 6 Even if many people do not act benevolently, the social
system can flourish. But a tiny minority can terrorize the rest of the
population unless strong prohibitions restrict the use of force.
Consider two polar extremes. When legal remedies are directed
against violence, the game is definitely worth the candle. Whatever
the defects of the legal process, remedies against force are the only
way to keep the social order from sliding into anarchy and chaos.
The legal decision not to impose a duty to rescue strangers does not
present that stark prospect of social disarray. Who would think it a
wise social reform to remove the prohibition against aggression and
substitute a modest obligation to be a good Samaritan? The priorities
between these two concerns should be clear. But, it may be asked,
why not have both? The answer is that imposing affirmative legal
duties necessarily increases the total level of coercion, public and
private, in society. The risk of excessive government power should
not be run because, in the good Samaritan context, self-help remedies
are usually effective. It is always possible to swim with a friend.
And when prudence fails, bystanders are free to rescue if they so
choose, and many will, precisely because they understand the enormous differences between their minor inconveniences and the gift of
life that they can confer. Only some professional economists talk 3 7 as
if there is an impenetrable barrier preventing interpersonal comparisons of utility. Most of us are quite happy to make such comparisons,
and do so with confidence, every day of our lives. Fortunately, despite
all the expansion of tort liability in many areas, the basic "no duty"
rule continues to prevail.
Glendon agrees with this assessment of the tort rule, but she has
two proposals. First, she supports the use of criminal sanctions but not tort actions (pp. 84-85) - to show societal condemnation of
the failure to rescue; in particular, she supports the measure adopted
in Vermont 38 (followed by Minnesota)39 of imposing a criminal fine of
$ioo for failure to perform an easy rescue (p. 88 n.39). Glendon
grossly overstates, however, the social effects of these still-born statutes when she writes that "[u]nless we are Vermonters or Minnesotans,
36 For the most recent and exhaustive account of this question, see ELLICKSON, supra note
24, at 52-64.

37 An occasional misguided lawyer makes the same error. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A
Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 201-02 (i973).
38 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973) (Supp. '991).
39See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West Sup,. 1992).
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we may have to be reconciled to the fact that, if we collapse on the
street, no mere passerby is obliged to help us, even by calling the
police" (p. 89). To my knowledge, no reported prosecutions have
taken place under these statutes, which suggests that their effects are
purely symbolic. If spurning an easy rescue costs no more than a
couple of parking tickets, we should all hope that the law is not an
effective teacher of what we would regard as morally proper conduct.
Second, Glendon laments the unwillingness or inability of judges
to extol constantly the virtues of meeting our social duties (p. 82). It
is, however, an excessively law-centered view of the universe that
regards judges as the repository of moral as well as legal wisdom.
The full range of intermediate social institutions - families, churches,
charities, and civic leaders - are, or at least should be, in a better
position to do this job, and it is a tribute to Glendon's common sense
that she is always searching for ways to strengthen these intermediate
institutions. However, the growth of big government and the welfare
state, which Glendon endorses, has weakened these intermediate institutions. Glendon again gets the matter backwards: "Our own tradition of the minimal 'night-watchman' state - well-suited for a young
nation endowed with vast natural resources and a vibrant civil society
has not generated much highly visible public language about responsibility" (p. 103). Yet the level of civic responsibility in America,
the willingness to care for neighbors and to lend a hand to persons in
need or distress, was surely greater in earlier days when the strong
cleavage between legal and moral duties was understood and respected
by the population at large. The night-watchman state is suitable not
only for new nations with vast resources, but for any nation, regardless of resource level, that seeks to draw upon the best of its citizenry.
It is a mistake to think that legal bonds only reinforce social bonds.
In many instances, they overpower and destroy them.
Finally, Glendon also traces the influence of the good Samaritan
issue to constitutional law, especially to the decision in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 40 in which the
Supreme Court decided whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 41 imposes a duty on local governments to protect
a helpless young boy from beatings and other abuses inflicted by his
father.42 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that "the Due Process
Clauses generally confers no affirmative right to governmental aid,
even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the
individual. '43 Glendon does not quarrel with the outcome of the case,
40 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
41 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § i.
42 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 191.
43 Id. at 196.
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but with the Court's failure to emphasize the moral and political duties
that governments routinely assume on such matters (pp. 94-95).
Protection against child abuse is, of course, securely on the short
list of duties for the night-watchman state, and thus any failure in
this regard cannot be attributed to an excessively individualistic view
of the law. Instead, the critical question is whether this duty is best
enforced by a child's tort action against public officials who could
have prevented the beating. Glendon rightly shies away from imposing such a legal duty, because she sensibly fears that it will bankrupt
local governments, keep all social workers tied up in litigation, or
lead to a withdrawal of needed services for fear of liability (p. 98).
In the face of these objections, her rhetorical point seems small, for
we all can and should join in a chorus of denunciation of child abuse
and the breakup of the family that is one of the causes of such abuse.
"Rights talk" remains, and should remain, at the periphery.

III.

ABORTION

I wish, finally, to address Glendon's treatment of abortion, an
issue on which she has written at length elsewhere. 4 4 Briefly stated,
her view is that the constitutionalization of the abortion question
produced the worst of all possible solutions (pp. 65-66). Women,
particularly young and vulnerable women, are guaranteed the constitutional right to have an abortion, but they are systematically denied
the social support structures that would allow them to exercise their
rights responsibly (pp. 65-66). According to Glendon, the German
(pp. 64-66) and Canadian (pp. 164-68) solutions are superior to ours
in several critical respects. First, these solutions place greater reliance
on legislation and compromise to create the rules governing abortions
(p. 167). Second, the rules thus created tend to give a more nuanced
treatment to the competing interests (pp. I65-66). Thus, the Germans
regard the survival of the fetus as important but suggest that "educational efforts and social assistance to pregnant women should be
foremost among the means used to protect developing life" (p. 64
emphasis in original). As the fetus moves closer to term, the level of
protection increases, as an intelligent form of balancing of interests
(p. 65).
44 See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987)
(comparing divorce and abortion laws in the United States and Western Europe). Glendon's
assertion that the wrong "rights talk" can inflame an issue is exemplified by her colleague
Laurence Tribe's book on abortion, which promotes the wrong absolutes and undermines public
discourse. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (i99O). For a
devastating critique, see Michael W. McConnell, How Not to Promote Serious Deliberation
About Abortion, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. ii81 (i99I ) (book review).
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As Glendon notes, this moderate approach has spared Europe and
Canada many of the prolonged political struggles that have racked
the United States (pp. 65-66, 168). Nonetheless, I question the normative foundations of the compromise solutions that Glendon endorses. The difficulty stems from the logical force of each of the rival
extreme positions. In my view, they share one feature, logical coherence, that Glendon's effort at compromise lacks.
Start with the critical question from which all doctrinal paths
descend: is the fetus a person? 45 Most opponents of legalized abortion
believe that the fetus is a form of human life and that taking that life
deliberately is a form of homicide. Given that most controversial
assumption, the only questions worth debating are whether the mother
may plead some extenuating circumstance to reduce or defeat criminal
charges, and whether third parties (who are not faced with these
extenuating circumstances) should bear the full brunt of the law's
force. If the fetus is not a person, however, no state interest can
counterbalance a woman's liberty interest in doing with her own body
what she pleases. If there is a constitutional right to marry at one's
pleasure or to have children, abortion falls under the larger rubric of
privacy rights. Thus, an enormous gulf divides those who think that
abortion is a deadly crime and those who regard it as the exercise of
a fundamental personal right.
Each side offers an internally coherent position that resists Glendon's effort to split the difference through responsible compromise.
She disapproves of both, but is unable to destroy either because she
avoids the central question of the fetus's personhood. To be sure,
counselling and educational support to pregnant women might help,
as Glendon hopes, but such support will be directed to fundamentally
different ends depending on who controls the show. The pro-life camp
would use such support to reinforce the fundamental criminal norm
of sanctity of life, which is why judges who favor Roe v. Wade46 have
been so suspicious of full information statutes. 4 7 The pro-choice camp
would use education and counselling to reinforce the woman's right
to autonomy, self-determination, and control.
I am pessimistic about our society's ability to resolve these differences, because no amount of artful compromise can bridge the huge
45 I expressed many of my views some years ago in Richard A. Epstein, Substantive Due
Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SuP. CT. REV. 159. These have changed
on matters of detail, but on matters quite irrelevant to Glendon's book. There is no prospect
of treating abortion as a problem amenable to a market solution because of the evident impossibility of fashioning any contract between mother and fetus, much less a contract for abortion

that works to their mutual advantage.
46 41

0

U.S. 11

3

(1973).

47 See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 456, 44649 (1983) (invalidating a state law requiring physicians in all cases to disclose the procedure and
risks attendant on abortion).
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moral divide represented by the person/nonperson dichotomy. The
abortion issue is vastly different from many questions of property and
economic liberties because there is, quite literally, no way to divide
the baby. On matters such as progressive taxation, persons with
fundamental disagreements on the proper structure of taxation can
nonetheless pound out some compromise on the matter of rates (steep
or gradual). The difficulty with abortion lies in the enduring split in
basic value structures in the United States. The secular left and the
religious right bring to this debate fundamental differences in philosophy. The good conversation over the dinner table broke down over
slavery before the Civil War and split families asunder. For similar
reasons, conversation has broken down on abortion as well. It takes
no crystal ball, but only a look at the recent controversy over abortion
counselling, 48 to see that the current struggles will continue with
undiminished intensity in the foreseeable future, no matter what the
future of Roe v. Wade.

IV. CONCLUSION

A sobering message from the abortion cases reveals the most serious difficulty with Mary Ann Glendon's book. The nature of dialogue often depends upon the structure of the legal regime in which
individual rights are asserted and denied. I conceive the basic relationship between dialogue and legal regime as follows. When there
are multiple players on both sides of a market situation, a system of
absolute rights works best, because unanimous consent is not necessary for this market to operate. When there are two or more players
that have holdout positions relative to each other, no system of absolute rights is likely to prove tenable, as in cases of low-level nuisance
in property law. The major mistake of many modern legal innovations
- for example, zoning, collective bargaining, and rent control - is
that they gratuitously convert areas of human endeavor in which
competitive markets can work into situations in which holdouts can
flourish.
At bottom, Glendon believes that it is possible to understand
rhetoric without understanding the underlying reality. In this respect,
her thesis is a distinguished successor to the forms of legal analysis
that flourished until a generation ago, when the dominant mode of
discourse in legal circles was cautious and incremental. Academic
lawyers usually took their cues about the major premises of the legal
system from sources outside the law and were suspicious of attempts
at what then might have been called grand theorizing but that now
48 See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, II, S. Ct. 1759, 1764 (iggi) (upholding against First Amend-

ment and due process challenges regulations prohibiting federally funded family planning programs from engaging in counseling concerning abortion or referrals for abortion).
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travel under the more favorable banner of foundational or paradigmshifting work. Instead, they conceived of their central mission as
applying their technical expertise to make improvements at the margins of the law. A generation of Harvard law students was raised on
the hypothetical case of the spoiled cantaloupes from the Hart and
49
Sacks materials.
The more modern impulse (and I have succumbed to it myself)
makes it more difficult for those who seek compromise. Scholars seek
to find single overarching themes that link together vast areas of law
and social life. The grand theory requires all parts of a problem to
be linked together in some programmatic whole, which makes compromise more difficult to reach. There are of course many such grand
theories in the modern legal academy. It is now de rigueur for the
educated law professor to commit to being a Lockean, Humean,
Hobbesian, Marxian, feminist, deconstructionist, libertarian, utilitarian, or communitarian (totalitarian, Freudian, and Spencerian seem
to be out today).
None of these systems is manufactured out of whole cloth. Each
responds to some powerful sentiments within our ever more heterogenous society. I confess my inability to solve all these value disputes,
and I know of no one else who can solve them either. But we can,
and must, learn from our attempts and failures. Indeed, this cultivated sense of informed skepticism offers the most urgent justification
for the strong constitutional protection of property rights. Informed
skepticism suggests that we shall resolve the fundamental differences
no matter what our rhetoric, no matter what our "rights talk."
Given this conclusion, our first order of business should not be, as
Glendon would have it, to improve the nature of public discourse
over rights. Rather, it should be to reduce the number of issues that
get dragged into the public sphere. Effecting such a reduction minimizes the constant tension between the requirements of unanimous
consent and majority will. If we demand unanimous consent, the
holdout prevails. If we tolerate the majority will, we risk tyranny by
the majority. Yet if instead we develop some grand division of turf
by individuals, by private agreement all parties can exchange and use
entitlements in ways that work to their mutual advantage. The first
concern on any political agenda is who shall make the decision, and
not what should be decided. Much useful work can be done in this
direction in property, contract, and torts. But abortion, yes abortion,
remains the toughest nut to crack.
49 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (tent. ed. i958).

Although it is a staple of the curriculum, the work never appeared in print. See, e.g., J. D.
Hyman, ConstitutionalJurisprudence and the Teaching of Constitutional Law, 28 STAN. L.
REv. 1271, 1286 n.70 (1976) (book review) ("[The Legal Process] must be the most influential
book not produced in movable type since Gutenberg.").

